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God’s Necessity and the Universe’s Contingency (Part 2)

January 22, 2010

In Part 1 of this series I presented a novel argument developed by TaiChi that sought to demonstrate the inconsistency of the set consisting of the following propositions:

(P0) The universe is contingent.
(P1) God had sufficient reason to create the universe as we know it.
(P2) A sufficient reason is an all-things-considered reason to perform one action over any other alternative.
(P4) To have an all-things-considered reason to act and refrain from acting (or to perform some alternative action) is irrational.
(P5) God is essentially rational.
(P8) God is necessary – he exists in every possible world.

Future posts will explore the inferences of TaiChi’s argument.  For now I’ll evaluate the propositions.  Some of them are loaded with meaning, but I will attempt to be as concise as possible.

EVALUATION

“(P0) The universe is contingent.”

What does this mean?  It means that the very great number of things we encounter or observe regularly might not have existed at all: things like planets, plants, and people.  If the universe is taken to be the set of all these types of things, then the universe need not exist.  Another way of saying this is that it’s possible for the universe not to exist.  This statement seems intuitively true – I can affirm it.

“(P2) A sufficient reason is an all-things-considered reason to perform one action over any other alternative.”

I’ll address (P2) before (P1) since (P1) contains (P2).  Here I take TaiChi to be defining “sufficient reason”, and as such will deny (P2) because it is not a correct definition.  Put succinctly, the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) states that every contingent event must have an explanation (see here, here, and here for more on the PSR).  So for any contingent event E, there must be a reason (or explanation) for the event.  Another way of understanding the PSR is to state that events do not happen without a reason, or explanation.  But this has nothing to do with whether an agent has considered all things when acting.

Now even if TaiChi meant only to describe a type of sufficient reason, I doubt that this is one.  It seems like we can explain phenomena without considering all things.  Hazel could identify the explanation for why her key went in her car’s ignition switch (she put the key in it), without having to consider say, the process of binary fission (for perhaps she doesn’t even know what binary fission is).

We need to address a concept that is central to TaiChi’s argument, but which I find to be a miscategorization.  It is this: agents do not have sufficient reasons, so defined, to act.  Rather, agents simply have reasons for their actions.  No matter how many compelling reasons an agent may have for performing an act, the effect will not occur without the agent performing the act.  Therefore, the agent itself is at least part of the sufficient reason for the effect.  It should be clear then that when using the PSR, it’s inappropriate to say that agents have sufficient reasons to act.

“(P1) God had sufficient reason to create the universe as we know it.”

It is difficult to evaluate (P1) once we have denied (P2).  Nevertheless, charitably we can offer the following modification:

“(P1*) God had an all-things-considered reason (or reasons) to create the universe as we know it.”

A typical theist affirms that God is omniscient.  As such, the theist will affirm that God is capable of considering all things.  The theist also will want to affirm that God created the universe as we know it for some reason, or possibly for multiple reasons.  So although I deny (P1), I can affirm (P1*).

“(P4) To have an all-things-considered reason to act and refrain from acting (or to perform some alternative action) is irrational.”

I’m not sure if TaiChi intends to define irrational here or offer a type of irrational behavior, but I’ll assume it’s the latter. So if that’s the case, let’s adopt a common usage for “irrational”.  It means something like “not endowed with reason, or actions of an agent without such endowment”.  Given this definition, the problem I have with accepting (P4) is that it is possible, simultaneously, to have reasons not to act.  So although someone may have a reason for acting even after considering all things, still it could be rational not to act if you had reasons for not doing so.  But suppose we offer the following modification:

“(P4*) To have an all-things-considered reason to act such that one will act, and refrain from acting (or to perform some alternative action) is irrational.”

What can we say about having a reason to do X such that one will do X, and still refrain from doing X?  We wouldn’t say that is irrational, we would say it is impossible.  For it is not possible for someone to perform X and not perform X.  So (P4*) doesn’t seem coherent – let’s modify it:

“(P4**) To have an all-things-considered reason to act such one will act, and refrain from acting (or to perform some alternative action) is impossible.”

I can agree to this, but maybe I have changed it too much for TaiChi’s liking.  In any event, I’ll deny (P4), but can affirm (P4**).

“(P5) God is essentially rational.”

To say that rationality is essential to God is to say that He would not be God if He was not rational. Taken in this sense, I can affirm this statement.

“(P8) God is necessary – he exists in every possible world.”

It is impossible for God not to exist – I can affirm this.

CONCLUSION

Affirmed:   (P0) The universe is contingent.
Denied:     (P1) God had sufficient reason to create the universe as we know it.
Denied:     (P2) A sufficient reason is an all-things-considered reason to perform one action over any other alternative.
Denied:     (P4) To have an all-things-considered reason to act and refrain from acting (or to perform some alternative action) is irrational.
Affirmed:  (P5) God is essentially rational.
Affirmed:  (P8) God is necessary – he exists in every possible world.

I can affirm the following modified propositions:

Affirmed:  (P1*) God had an all-things-considered reason (or reasons) to create the universe as we know it.
Affirmed:  (P4**) To have an all-things-considered reason to act such that one will act, and refrain from acting (or to perform some alternative action) is impossible.

Before evaluating the inferences to his argument, I’ll offer TaiChi an opportunity to either maintain his propositions in their original formulations, explain them a little more (it’s possible I’ve misunderstood them), or modify them.  So there probably won’t be another post on this subject for at least a few more days.

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13 comments

  1. Hi.

    “Here I take TaiChi to be defining “sufficient reason”, and as such will deny (P2) because it is not a correct definition. Put succinctly, the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) states that every contingent event must have an explanation”
    It seems to me that, the way I’ve written the argument, it doesn’t contain the principle of sufficient reason after all. What it contains instead is ordinary, everyday notion of a sufficient reason. As such, your rejection of it on the grounds that it does not define the PSR is unmotivated. You’re not rejecting the premise because of what it says, but because it doesn’t say what you think it should.

    “It is this: agents do not have sufficient reasons, so defined, to act. Rather, agents simply have reasons for their actions.”
    I hope you’ll elaborate on this, because I don’t understand your criticism. I think you might be confusing a reason with an explanation – given your take on (P2), I can see why.

    “Therefore, the agent itself is at least part of the sufficient reason for the effect.”
    I don’t deny this anywhere in my argument.

    “So although someone may have a reason for acting even after considering all things, still it could be rational not to act if you had reasons for not doing so.”
    That’s wrong. Suppose Hazel is late for work, and takes her car via the quickest route she can to work. A pedestrian steps in front of the car. Weighing up an extended jail term against a mild reprimand from her boss, and finding that the reprimand is much more attractive than the jail term, she nevertheless continues to accelerate, and ploughs through the pedestrian. She gets to work on time, but is later convicted for manslaughter. By your lights, Hazel was rational – didn’t she, after all, have a reason to accelerate rather than brake?
    It gets worse. For consider that, regarding any non-action (or alternative action) whatsoever, one can always find a reason in its favor. A universal example would be that to decide to not act (or to perform an alternative action) would be to perform an act of free will, and given that the exercise of free will is commonly touted as a good, one always has a positive reason for whatever one does. So every act is rational, on your view.

    “(P4**) To have an all-things-considered reason to act such one will act, and refrain from acting (or to perform some alternative action) is impossible.”
    Supposedly, this modification is meant to substitute back into the argument and preserve its integrity. Despite its being unmotivated, I don’t see how it does that, so I don’t see why you suggest it.


  2. Hi TaiChi,

    —–
    TaiChi: “It seems to me that, the way I’ve written the argument, it doesn’t contain the principle of sufficient reason after all. What it contains instead is ordinary, everyday notion of a sufficient reason. As such, your rejection of it on the grounds that it does not define the PSR is unmotivated. You’re not rejecting the premise because of what it says, but because it doesn’t say what you think it should.”

    Reid: Your original argument back on Common Sense Atheism relied on the PSR – the assumption that it was true was one item in the supposed inconsistent set. I thought you were relying on it’s definition in (P2). Just so I’m clear: you are defining the “everyday notion of a sufficient reason” in (P2)? If so, would you agree that only those who are omniscient can have sufficient reasons? For only if one is omniscient can they consider all things when acting.

    —–
    TaiChi: “I hope you’ll elaborate on this, because I don’t understand your criticism. I think you might be confusing a reason with an explanation – given your take on (P2), I can see why.”

    Reid: In (P1) you are assuming God, an agent, can have sufficient reasons. Since I disagreed that agents can have sufficient reasons (apparently misunderstanding your definition), my criticism was relevant for denying (P1).

    —–
    Reid: “Therefore, the agent itself is at least part of the sufficient reason for the effect.”

    TaiChi: “I don’t deny this anywhere in my argument.”

    Reid: To have a sufficient reason for performing X and to be at least part of the sufficient reason for X are mutually exclusive, unless you equivocate on “sufficient reason”.

    —–
    TaiChi: “So every act is rational, on your view.”

    Reid: Well, persons are essentially rational, meaning they have reasoning capacity. I would argue when someone acts and expresses reasons for acting that we don’t understand, or that we wouldn’t find compelling, or that are morally wrong, we say the other person is “rationalizing”. Every act is rational in this sense.

    —–
    TaiChi: “Supposedly, this modification is meant to substitute back into the argument and preserve its integrity. Despite its being unmotivated, I don’t see how it does that, so I don’t see why you suggest it.”

    Reid: No problem, we can drop it. I was offering it as a modification because it seemed to me that (P4) was false.


  3. Reid: Your original argument back on Common Sense Atheism relied on the PSR – the assumption that it was true was one item in the supposed inconsistent set. I thought you were relying on it’s definition in (P2). Just so I’m clear: you are defining the “everyday notion of a sufficient reason” in (P2)?

    TaiChi: It’s true, I thought I was producing an argument using the PSR, but what I’d actually done is to use a consequence of the PSR in the theistic story instead. If a full explanation of the sort the PSR calls for is to be found in God’s choice, and God could choose other than he did being free, then there must be some explanation for God’s particular choice, else we do not have a full (sufficient) explanation. An explanation for a choice is a reason.

    —-
    Reid: If so, would you agree that only those who are omniscient can have sufficient reasons? For only if one is omniscient can they consider all things when acting.

    TaiChi: No, because I take it that “all-things-considered” just covers what is relevant to the choice. It’s also worth pointing out, since we’re having trouble with the word ‘reason’, that I am using it to identify something internal to an agent – the combination between beliefs and desires that jointly explain action.
    Thus, one has an all-things-considered reason when one is aware of one’s own beliefs and desires which are relevant to their decision, and finds that the motivational balance of those beliefs and desires tilt in favor of a course of action. (It’s therefore a second-order reason in this way). The additional specification that it be a reason to “perform one action over any other alternative” is to secure the unique favoritism of the course of action.

    —-
    Reid: To have a sufficient reason for performing X and to be at least part of the sufficient reason for X are mutually exclusive, unless you equivocate on “sufficient reason”.

    TaiChi: I didn’t expect to be charged with equivocation when responding to the way you were using your terms. Just so you’re clear: nowhere in my argument do I deny that the agent is part of the explanation or cause of some effect.

    —-
    Reid: Well, persons are essentially rational, meaning they have reasoning capacity. I would argue when someone acts and expresses reasons for acting that we don’t understand, or that we wouldn’t find compelling, or that are morally wrong, we say the other person is “rationalizing”. Every act is rational in this sense.

    TaiChi: I think you’ve failed to engage with my example, and changed the subject. Is Hazel’s choice rational or irrational, in the same strong sense in which God is supposed to be rational?


  4. TaiChi: “It’s true, I thought I was producing an argument using the PSR, but what I’d actually done is to use a consequence of the PSR in the theistic story instead. If a full explanation of the sort the PSR calls for is to be found in God’s choice, and God could choose other than he did being free, then there must be some explanation for God’s particular choice, else we do not have a full (sufficient) explanation. An explanation for a choice is a reason.”

    Reid: Thanks for the clarification.

    —-
    TaiChi: “…I take it that ‘all-things-considered’ just covers what is relevant to the choice. It’s also worth pointing out, since we’re having trouble with the word ‘reason’, that I am using it to identify something internal to an agent – the combination between beliefs and desires that jointly explain action.”

    Reid: Which is it: an explanation for the choice, or an explanation for the action (that was chosen to perform)? You used the former in your comment directly above, but it seemed like you used the latter in this comment. There is a difference, namely the agent carrying out what he has chosen to do. If you agree to the following as a more accurate replacement for (P2), then I think we can move on from this:
    ‘(P2*) A sufficient reason is an all-things-relative-to-the-choice explanation for choosing to perform one action over any other alternative.’

    TaiChi: “The additional specification that it be a reason to ‘perform one action over any other alternative’ is to secure the unique favoritism of the course of action.”

    Reid: What you’re saying is that a sufficient reason for X cannot also be a sufficient reason for Y, right? If so, then I agree.

    —-
    TaiChi: “I didn’t expect to be charged with equivocation when responding to the way you were using your terms. Just so you’re clear: nowhere in my argument do I deny that the agent is part of the explanation or cause of some effect.”

    Reid: I’ll assume you agree to (P2*). Using (P2*), I can show you what I mean. Suppose Jane’s sufficient reason for choosing to start her car is to give her neighbor a ride to work. So here is the choice:
    (C) Jane choosing to starting her car
    …and the sufficient reason:
    (SR) Jane giving her neighbor a ride to work
    The question is: How could (C) be a part of a sufficient reason for (C)? A sufficient reason is logically prior to a choice. To make sense of “sufficient reason” defined in (P2*), you would have to deny the following as a sufficient reason for (C):
    (SRC) Jane giving her neighbor a ride to work and Jane choosing to start her car
    One hasn’t given an explanation for the choice (C) by using (C) in (SRC), because (SRC) contains a simple restatement of the choice. The agent cannot be part of the explanation for her choice, rather the agent has an explanation for her choice (or as you put it, the reason is internal to the agent).

    —-
    TaiChi: I think you’ve failed to engage with my example, and changed the subject. Is Hazel’s choice rational or irrational, in the same strong sense in which God is supposed to be rational?

    Reid: Acts are rational if and only if they are performed for reasons. Hazel had reasons for her actions, so the act was rational. Her act (plowing through the pedestrian) was of course wrong, and her reasons for doing it were poor, but nevertheless they were reasons. None of this should be controversial, given the definition. Would you like to define acts as rational if and only if they are performed for sufficient reasons? What do you mean by “strong sense” of rational, particularly if you opt for limiting it to acts performed only for sufficient reasons?


  5. Reid: Which is it: an explanation for the choice, or an explanation for the action (that was chosen to perform)?

    TaiChi: Both, isn’t it? The explanation of one often does for the other. But strictly, I suppose we shouldn’t be talking about explanation at all, having left behind the PSR – I use it as a pointer to what I mean, not a definition. I guess I should’ve said that reasons were combinations of beliefs and desires and left it at that.

    Reid: There is a difference, namely the agent carrying out what he has chosen to do.

    TaiChi: This seems a pointless splitting of hairs, given that we’re considering an omnipotent agent.

    Reid: (P2*) A sufficient reason is an all-things-relative-to-the-choice explanation for choosing to perform one action over any other alternative.

    TaiChi: Another hair-splitting exercise, given that your God is omniscient. But if you intend to use this awkward sentence, can I suggest you replace “relative” with “relevant”? At first I thought you were tarring me with social constructivism.

    Reid:What you’re saying is that a sufficient reason for X cannot also be a sufficient reason for Y, right?

    Taichi: That’s a consequence. A sufficient reason for X couldn’t be a sufficient reason for Y, given that the merits of Y (so far as the agent is aware) are taken account of in the sufficient reason for X (but outweighed by the merits of X, hence there is reason to perform X).

    Reid: A sufficient reason is logically prior to a choice.

    TaiChi: Agreed.

    Reid: One hasn’t given an explanation for the choice (C) by using (C) in (SRC), because (SRC) contains a simple restatement of the choice. The agent cannot be part of the explanation for her choice, rather the agent has an explanation for her choice

    Reid: To have a sufficient reason for performing X and to be at least part of the sufficient reason for X are mutually exclusive

    TaiChi: Well, if that is what you think, then notice that (C) is a proposition about an agent’s choice. In that case, (C)’s not forming part of the sufficient reason for (C) doesn’t entail that the agent mentioned in (C) is not part of that sufficient reason.
    But are you really saying what I think you’re saying? That an agent’s self-knowledge of their own agency isn’t part of the reason for their choice? It looks to me to be essential, on the contrary.

    Reid: Acts are rational if and only if they are performed for reasons.

    TaiChi: I flatly disagree. Having a reason is necessary, but not sufficient for rationality. If every act is rational, as you seem to admit by your definition, then this is a good reason to give up the definition. It provides no useful contrast, where contrast between cases to which the word applies and cases to which it does not is what makes the word informative, even meaningful. But to call someone ‘rational’ is informative and meaningful, and so you’re wrong.

    Reid: Would you like to define acts as rational if and only if they are performed for sufficient reasons?

    TaiChi: No, but I’m happy to describe acts as irrational where the agent has a sufficient reason and acts contrary to it.

    Reid: What do you mean by “strong sense” of rational..

    TaiChi: I mean to point out to you that, even were I to grant some degenerate sense in which rationality only requires having a reason (anything will do), God is supposedly meets my higher standard as well.
    So, here, you can have the word ‘rational’ (though I think you’ve abused it), and I’ll construct a term ‘rational+’ to describe my supererogative idea of rationality. Substituting ‘rational+’ for ‘rational’ in premises P5 and using its contradictory in P4, I’ll still have just as good an argument as before, unless you’d care to deny that God meets my higher intellectual standard.


  6. TaiChi,
    I will make the one word change to (P2*) that you requested, I agree it makes more sense that way. I think we’ve come to agreement over everything except two points:

    —–
    TaiChi: But are you really saying what I think you’re saying? That an agent’s self-knowledge of their own agency isn’t part of the reason for their choice? It looks to me to be essential, on the contrary.
    Reid: No, all I’m saying is that the choice itself is not part of something that is internal to the agent that explains the choice. A reason (something an agent has internally that is an explanation for his choice) is logically prior to the choice itself.

    —–

    We need to come to some agreement on a positive definition of rationality, because you rely on it in (P5), and on its negation in (P4). You’ve said that you disagree that an act is rational iff it is done for a reason, saying that it provides no useful contrast. I would disagree, and offer examples of unconscious actions as irrational. We wouldn’t say that we have reasons for choosing to breathe while we sleep. Yet you also disagree that an act is rational iff it is done for a sufficient reason. You hinted at some supererogative idea of rationality “rational+” that you could use in (P5), but I don’t know how to understand “rational+”, other than “a property that is essential to God”. If you don’t offer a positive definition, then it seems we are at a stalemate for evaluating (P5). Your thoughts?


  7. Reid: I will make the one word change to (P2*) that you requested, I agree it makes more sense that way

    TaiChi: It requires another change – ‘reason’ should stand in place of ‘explanation’. We’re both going to get confused otherwise.

    Reid: No, all I’m saying is that the choice itself is not part of something that is internal to the agent that explains the choice. A reason (something an agent has internally that is an explanation for his choice) is logically prior to the choice itself.

    TaiChi: To put it in other terms: a cause is distinct from its effect, and if a reason (along with the exercise of free-will) is the cause and the choice made is the effect, then the former is distinct from the latter – yes? Well, that seems fine.

    Reid: We need to come to some agreement on a positive definition of rationality, because you rely on it in (P5), and on its negation in (P4).

    TaiChi: Do I? I don’t think I am required to give definitions of every single term I use in an argument. It helps, if you are genuinely muddled over what a term means and I want to persuade you, but I’m not willing or interested to accept it as a burden of proof.

    Reid: You’ve said that you disagree that an act is rational iff it is done for a reason, saying that it provides no useful contrast.

    TaiChi: That summation suggests you didn’t get my point. Descriptive terms like ‘rational’ have a meaning in virtue of the fact that they are consistently affirmed of certain situations and denied of others. Because they are used in this consistent way, a hearer/reader can infer from the affirmation (use) of the term that the situation is similar to the other situations in which he has known the term to be affirmed, or from the denial of the term that the situation is dissimilar to situations in which the term has been affirmed. In this way, descriptive terms are informative – put generally, a difference in language correlates with a differnce in world.
    Contrast this with your suggestion that, perhaps, “everyone is rational”. That just means that the term “rational” is appropriately appplied to everybody. But if it’s applied to everybody, how does applying it to one particular person inform a hearer/reader about anything?
    Lest I go too far, I’ll grant you that “rational” would still have meaning if applied to all humans, but not to other animals or objects. But I don’t see how this helps you, for to call a person ‘rational’ is still meaningful and informative, which implies that the word applies to some humans but not others. The inmates at an asylum are good candidates for the latter, even if you otherwise have an optimistic outlook on humankind.

    Reid: I would disagree, and offer examples of unconscious actions as irrational. We wouldn’t say that we have reasons for choosing to breathe while we sleep.

    TaiChi: True, if we call these actions (I don’t – no agent is responsible for them, and actions imply agency). But again, I can sharpen my criticism by pointing out that to call a conscious person (and doesn’t that sound redundant?) ‘rational’ is meaningful and informative, so therefore the term does not apply equally to all conscious humans.
    In any case, your examples don’t contradict my rejection of your definition. You say that having a reason is necessary and sufficent for rationality, and I have denied that it is sufficient. So having a reason could still be necessary. Suppose that it were. Then unconscious actions, unmotivated by reason, would not be rational, or irrational.


  8. Reid: Yet you also disagree that an act is rational iff it is done for a sufficient reason.

    TaiChi: I haven’t said that, but I would deny it, yes. An act or choice can be rational even if we don’t take the time to consider our relevant beliefs or desires, particularly when a quick decision is called for.

    Reid: You hinted at some supererogative idea of rationality “rational+” that you could use in (P5), but I don’t know how to understand “rational+”, other than “a property that is essential to God”. If you don’t offer a positive definition, then it seems we are at a stalemate for evaluating (P5). Your thoughts?

    TaiChi: The point of constructing ‘rational+’ was to show you that we’re not at a stalemate. We don’t actually need to agree on what ‘rational’ means in order to move forward, since what matters for the argument is that God wouldn’t act in the manner described in (P4). If doing X is not R, and G is necessarily R, then in no possible world does G perform X. Do we need to know what R is in order to judge the inference as valid? No – we merely need to note that the substitution is consistent. If you’re happy to accept that God wouldn’t have “an all-things-relevant-to-the-choice reason for choosing to perform one action over any other alternative” and choose to refrain from performing that action or to perform an alternative action, then there’s no need for a definition.

    Why, then, do I use the term? Because I conceive of ‘rational’ as a term which is evaluative – as passing judgment on the reasoning abilities of an agent. By putting it into the argument I hope to point out to you that if God fails to choose or act according to a sufficient reason which he has, then he thereby impugns his intellectual character. As I expect you’ll want to deny that, I also expect that you’ll want to agree that God would do as I have said. So long as you’re clear the denial that God acts according to a sufficient reason if he has one carries with it a deprecatory valuation inconsonant with the supposed perfect character of God, then you can, for all purposes, ignore the specific content of the term.
    That ‘rational’ is an evaluative and not just descriptive term should tell you why I’m reluctant to give a definition – the application of such terms are notoriously controversial, and some will even deny that they have cognitive content, so that no definition would be possible. But, as with arguments over the ‘good’, I thought that we’d at least share the assumption that the term applied to the concept of God, whereas it is properly withheld from an agent who does as (P4) describes. We need some common ground, and this would do, but we don’t need to agree on everything.


  9. TaiChi,

    I appreciate your explanation of why and how you are using the term “rational”. But if you prefer to use it as an evaluative term while also declining to commit to sufficient conditions for it, then I’d prefer to remove it from the argument so that we can eliminate any concomitant subjectivity as well. It seems we can dispense with the discussion over sufficient conditions for “rationality” since you offer the following:

    TaiChi: If you’re happy to accept that God wouldn’t have “an all-things-relevant-to-the-choice reason for choosing to perform one action over any other alternative” and choose to refrain from performing that action or to perform an alternative action, then there’s no need for a definition.

    I think we’ve come to a better understanding of the nature of your argument. Allow me to list what I take to be the statements comprising the supposed inconsistent set, and please confirm or correct them.

    First we should make explicit what we take to be a “reason” in this context. A “reason” is something internal to an agent, logically prior to an agent’s choice, that is an explanation for the choice. Here is the supposed inconsistent set:

    (P0) The universe is contingent.
    (P1) God had sufficient reason to create the universe as we know it.
    (P2*) A sufficient reason is an all-things-relevant-to-the-choice reason for choosing to perform one action over any other alternative.
    (P4) (Not Used)
    (P5*) God would not have a sufficient reason to create the universe as we know it and refrain from creating the universe as we know it.
    (P6) God is necessary – he exists in every possible world.

    Do you have anything else to change, or add?


  10. No, I think I’ll leave it there. Your move.


  11. TaiChi,
    I’m working on the next part, but other obligations have occupied me recently. Thanks for your patience.
    T


  12. No problem, I’m still checking in from time to time, so I won’t miss your next post.


  13. I’m also awaiting part 3.



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